As I begin this series of blogs some definitions are in order. I will be focusing on a specific part of pyramidal neurons, the dendrites and their apical tufts. The information I am sharing is extracted from two articles, the first: M. W. Spratling, “Cortical Region Interactions and the Role of Apical Dendrites,” Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 1(3): 219-228, 2002, and the second: Nelson Spruston, “Pyramical Neurons: Dendritic Structure and Synaptic Integration,” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, Vol. 9, March 2008, 206-221.

The cerebral cortex consists of a laminar structure of six layers. The cell bodies of pyramidal cells, the most abundant type of cortical neuron, are found in layers II-VI and have distinct morphologies, including two separate dendritic arbors: the basal dendrites which occupy the same layer as the cell body and the apical dendrites which ascend into more superficial layers. For pyramidal cells in layer VI the apical dendrites extend to layer IV, and for pyramidal cells in the other layers the apical dendrites extend to layer I where they are quite dense. Pyramidal cells consist of the only neurons that project outside the cortex “and [are] the primary source of connections between different cortical areas. This class of cell is thus likely to have a major role in cortical information processing.” (I remind the reader that information can only be generated by a mind, discussed in detail in previous blogs and in my books.)

Both the apical and basal dendrites receive connections with axons originating in different cortical areas. They are rich in dendritic spines that project from the dendritic body and along its length to make connections with boutons, specialized pre-synaptic structures at the ends of axons. Between the bouton and the spine is a very narrow synaptic cleft across which neural transmitters flow to generate action potentials transmitted through synaptic networks. Spines are highly variable in their size and shape and are plastic, changing with experience. “It has been suggested that thin, dynamic spines might be available to contribute to learning, whereas larger, more stable spines might be involved in the storage of established memories. Repeated activation of small spines leads to increase in their size by the Hebbian process discussed in my books.

Spruston describes pyramidal neurons as having basal and apical dendrites along with apical tufts. In my research I wonder if the wave forms that appear to be generated by cognition of the immaterial mind interact with the spines of apical dendrites within the apical tufts? Does this interaction occur at ionic channels in the tufts and/or in the specialized, pre-synaptic structures? Are axons involved? What is the result of the proposed interaction, and how are spike trains of action potentials generated that are transmitted through synaptic channels to bring about intended action? As this discussion proceeds I shall address these questions in relation to my postulate that apical tufts are sites for interaction with the immaterial mind.

My discussion that follows will focus on the basics of apical dendritic function which is markedly complex. The two articles to which I am making reference discuss this function in more detail. My focus is to address only one aspect of its function in relation to cognitive activity within the cerebral cortex, giving expression to related points made in earlier blogs in this context. Each blog that follows in this series will be entitled, “Apical tufts in cognition, part 1, 2, etc.” I invite the reader to brainstorm along with me as I make the case for dualist interaction!

In my succeeding blogs I will post excerpts from and my discussions in response to recent neuroscience articles that address the apical and distal tufts of the pyramidal cells of the neocortex. I offer a postulate that suggests how the proposed wave forms generated by the cognitive mind interact directly with these structures to actualize the mind’s intention for action, whether it be the movement of an extremity, a creative thought or a spoken word, even from the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit may be offering us an explanation of this interaction, a manifestation of his progressive revelation so that we can come to a personal, intimate communion with our Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. These articles are hard to come by! Where knowledge is expressly lacking by the neuroscientists to explain the function of these tufts one has the opportunity to propose explanations that can be tested to grow our knowledge and faith. It is all about confirming concordance between Scripture and neuroscience. Please read on.

It is my hope that dualist interaction between the immaterial and material has been compellingly defended both in my books and blogs by showing concordance between Scripture and neuroscience. Jesus sent as He promised the Holy Spirit to indwell those in repentance, to provide Counsel and Help to believers by faith to this present day. God is Spirit, as is His Holy Spirit, which indwells people via the immaterial human spirit, created in Man at his creation. We have seen that there is now evidence that the immaterial Spirit is causal through the human spirit on the immaterial human mind, with actions manifested in and through the material brain and body. This reality provides understanding of Ephesians 2:19-22:

Consequently, you are no longer foreigners and aliens, but fellow citizens with God’s people and members of God’s household, built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus himself as the chief cornerstone. In him the whole building is joined together and rise to become a holy temple in the Lord. And in him you too are being built together to become a dwelling in which God lives by his Spirit.

I now turn to the work of Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp and Mario Beauregard entitled “Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 2005, 360: 1309-1327. In the abstract to their article they stated, Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. “feeling,” “knowing” and “effort”) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century.

I conclude this series of posts from the article by Reilly LaRose with the following comments drawing from Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato:

The conclusion they arrive at is that neuroscience, while peddling a materialist explanation of mind in most cases, tacitly or implicitly holds a dualistic philosophy of mind: “nothing in literature explains why a certain neural phenomenon should produce a certain phenomenal experience. . . . Neuroscience faces an impossible mission . . . showing how a physical world which had been a priori defined as devoid of those properties that are essential of mind may contain or produce those properties.” What Manzotti and Moderato call this situation is an “ontological promissory note” of explanation, meaning that neuroscientists who hold materialist views can only promise that someday the cashing out of explanation for mind in physical terms and causes will be realized. All the while, a dualistic conception of mind and body is guiding the language and practice of neuroscience, for what a materialist calls “mental properties” doesn’t elude the problems associated with materialism and mind. As Manzotti and Moderato put it, these “mental properties” function the same as a dualist’s “mental qualities” in philosophical terms. Both are treated as things in themselves and inexplicable from the perspective of pure physicalism.

In continuing this particular blog series addressing substance dualism and its compatibility with dualist interactionism, I am posting comments by LaRose citing Ralph C. S. Walker:

Walker states that on the basis of reason, the mental cannot solely be the physical. . . . reason provides sufficient justification to believe the mind is not physical since the process of reason interrupts the chain of physical determinism. . . . what reason does is “moves minds” towards certain ideas and behavior. In this way, no matter our physical being, should reason exist ontologically, then no conception of mind remains within the bounds of physical determinism solely: there must be a mental outside the physical to be moved by reason. . . . Further, having a separate, mental existence sets one up to subscribe to an enduring self beyond the physical. . . . Substance dualism holds a simple and profound answer for these observations of conscious life: the soul, the mind, the self is that which feels. We are more than the collection of qualitative phenomenal experiences, but that which experiences them.

I am working to present compelling evidence for dualist interactionism between the immaterial mind, including the Mind of God, and the material synaptic networks of the human brain. Cognition by the mind is a causal force that generates action. I will continue to post more recent data from the neurosciences and neuropsychology to substantiate this perspective going forward.

LaRose stated, What seems to be captured in . . . substance dualism is the relationship between the body and soul - a meshing that makes consciousness capable of abstraction and thinking through the perceptual organs and phenomenal experience associated with embodiment. But in what sense can I call myself a unified “self” if my body isn’t my whole being? . . . a unified self exists over and above each of these consciousness and bodily experiences. . . . Because there is an enduring soul melded intimately with the body, the stimulations of the body coalesce into various inputs that the soul or mind sits over and above to experience and make decisions over.

I am including another excerpt from LaRose’s article:

Substance dualism, under the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, can be understood as affirming “a substance is characterized by its properties, but . . . it is more than the collection of the properties it possesses; it is the thing which possesses them. So, the mind is not just a collection of thoughts but is that which thinks - an immaterial substance over and above its immaterial states.” The roots of substance dualism are seated in a metaphysic which argues for the existence of both a physical body and immaterial mind within humans. . . . At base, there are two substances (maybe more) in existence, and humans are constituted by both. Many philosophers point out this unification of body and soul can be understood as a marriage of substances to accomplish beauty and purpose. This union doesn’t downplay the intimacy and interaction of both substances, nor does it deny that both substances are distinct.

I have found an article that addresses substance dualism, essentially another term that can be applied to dualist interactionism. I share excerpts from this article that will be of value in clarifying what is meant by these terms, especially since the perspectives of monism, determinism, materialist reductionism and macroevolution still dominate much of the literature of neuroscience. The article is entitled “What Is Man, that You are Mindful of him? The Harmony of Substance Dualism and MBTI.” It is authored by Reilly LaRose from Taylor University, dated 2020, a student of Dr. Seeman, Philosophy of Mind. The article can be found at https://pillars.taylor.edu/philosophy/1. I will post a series of excerpts from this article. I will not address MBTI but focus on explanations presented by the author for substance dualism.

The author referred to Carl Jung who “saw particular functions of the mental life as being dichotomies of measurable personality traits. The four . . . he noticed were that of sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling. Sensation is the capacity for perception of sense-datum, intuition the capacity for perception of conceptual datum, thinking the capacity for reason or rational judgment, and feeling as the capacity for emotive or irrational judgment.”

The author uses Jung’s four categories of mental life to discuss substance dualism and contrasts them with materialism, or the physical body. Please read on in the following blogs.

Pertinent to the preceding posts I wish to add verses from Romans 8: 5-14:

Those who live according to the sinful nature have their minds set on what that nature desires; but those who live in accordance with the Spirit have their minds set on what the Spirit desires. The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the Spirit is life and peace; the sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God’s law, nor can it do so. Those controlled by the sinful nature cannot please God. You, however, are controlled not by the sinful nature but by the Spirit, if the Spirit of God lives in you [indwells you]. And if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Christ. But if Christ is in you, your body is dead because of sin, yet your [human]spirit is alive because of righteousness. And it the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead is living in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit, who lives in you. Therefore, brothers, we have an obligation - but it is not to the sinful nature, to live according to it. For if you live according to the sinful nature, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the misdeeds of the body, you will live, because those who are led by the Spirit of God are Sons of God. [We see dualist interactionism manifest in these verses.]