I now turn to the work of Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp and Mario Beauregard entitled “Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 2005, 360: 1309-1327. In the abstract to their article they stated, Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. “feeling,” “knowing” and “effort”) are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century.