I conclude this series of posts from the article by Reilly LaRose with the following comments drawing from Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato:
The conclusion they arrive at is that neuroscience, while peddling a materialist explanation of mind in most cases, tacitly or implicitly holds a dualistic philosophy of mind: “nothing in literature explains why a certain neural phenomenon should produce a certain phenomenal experience. . . . Neuroscience faces an impossible mission . . . showing how a physical world which had been a priori defined as devoid of those properties that are essential of mind may contain or produce those properties.” What Manzotti and Moderato call this situation is an “ontological promissory note” of explanation, meaning that neuroscientists who hold materialist views can only promise that someday the cashing out of explanation for mind in physical terms and causes will be realized. All the while, a dualistic conception of mind and body is guiding the language and practice of neuroscience, for what a materialist calls “mental properties” doesn’t elude the problems associated with materialism and mind. As Manzotti and Moderato put it, these “mental properties” function the same as a dualist’s “mental qualities” in philosophical terms. Both are treated as things in themselves and inexplicable from the perspective of pure physicalism.