In support of dualist interactionism I am identifying a lengthy article by Edward Feser that appeared in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2013. Its title is “Kripke, Ross, and the Immaterial Aspects of Thought.” Feser cites comments by the materialist philosopher of mind, Jerry Fodor, who stated, “Lots of mental states are conscious, lots of mental states are intentional, and lots of mental processes are rational, and the question does rather suggest itself how anything that is material could be any of these.” One of the authors, the late James Ross, formulated a “powerful argument for the immateriality of our intellectual operations.” (His argument for the immateriality of the intellect was rooted in the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition.) He identified a contrast between “the determinacy of thought and the indeterminacy of the physical.” Favoring the immateriality of thought is “the contrast between the universality of thought and the particularity of physical processes.” The determinacy of thought was considered by him to be immaterial.