Human will and the readiness potential

In her review Gholipour wrote that Aaron Schurger, a researcher at the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in Paris, “studied fluctuations in neuronal activity, the churning hum in the brain that emerges from the spontaneous flickering of hundreds of thousands of interconnected neurons, . . . an ongoing electrophysiological noise [that] rises and falls in slow tides.” In his review of Kornhuber and Deecke’s innovative approach to the study of this activity he found “no purpose behind these apparent trends . . . . the pattern would simply reflect how various factors had happened to coincide.” When he examined his own data from studies using the same method as the German team he “saw something that looked like the Bereitschaftspotential . . . [but considered that the] rising pattern wasn’t a mark of a brain’s brewing intention at all, but something much more circumstantial.” Gholipour shared that “neuroscientists know that for people to make any type of decision, our neurons need to gather evidence for each option.” In my books and blogs I have discussed how cognition initiates activity in the memory codes in the supplementary motor areas followed by the transmission of spike trains of action potentials through synaptic networks to, for example, move a finger or arm. There is prior neural activity just prior to the willful intent for physical action in this instance. Gholipour referred to more recent studies by Schurger and Princeton colleagues that “repeated a version of Libet’s experiment,” finding that brain activity in their subjects began only 150 milliseconds before a movement, “the time people reported making decisions in Libet’s original experiment. . . . In other words, people’s subjective experience of a decision - what Libet’s study seemed to suggest was just an illusion - appeared to match the actual moment their brains showed them making a decision.” Schurger’s studies “showed the Bereitschaftspotential may not be what we thought it was.” Gholipour pointed out in her article that Schurger’s work did not solve the question of free will any more than Libet’s did, but did deepen the question. In my more recent blogs I have identified several actions in synaptic networks that occur as a result of cognitive intent, including the proposed generation of wave forms that are transmitted via quantum tunneling to stimulate action potentials. Might this activity be included in the 150 milliseconds prior to a movement, thus giving support to dualist interaction between the immaterial mind and the material synaptic networks of the human brain?

Stan Lennard