To illustrate the commitment to a monistic, materialistic view of human volition, or intent, I am including some excerpts from an article by Patrick Haggard of the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London. The article is “Human Volition: Towards a Neuroscience of Will,” Nature Reviews, Neuroscience, Vol. 9, December, 2008. I invite you to review this article and draw your own conclusion. I include it to show the resistance encountered when making a case for dualist interaction between the immaterial mind and the material synaptic networks of the human brain, a compelling case I have endeavored to make.
In the abstract Haggard writes, “The capacity for voluntary action is seen as essential to human nature. Yet neuroscience and behaviorist psychology have traditionally dismissed the topic as unscientific, perhaps because the mechanisms that cause actions have long been unclear. However, new research has identified networks of brain areas, including the pre-supplementary motor area, the anterior prefrontal cortex and the parietal cortex, that underlie voluntary action [I submit they facilitate voluntary action]. These areas generate information for forthcoming actions [I submit that the cognitive, immaterial MIND generates the specified information that is instantiated in neural codes of memory and selected for action] . . . Volition consists of a series of decisions regarding whether to act, what action to perform and when to perform it [Does this process reside in the mind or in the material brain?].
Haggard states in his introduction that “A dualistic view of endogenous causation is engrained in our normal language. Everyday language suggests that ‘I’ consciously choose to perform actions and that ‘my’ choice somehow causes the action to occur. This language is dualistic, as it implies a mental ‘I’ that is distinct from both the brain and the body but that can nevertheless trigger brain events and, thus, bodily movement.” If you are familiar with the contents of my books and blogs you will see the similarity between these comments and those I have presented that are associated with data from the neurosciences!
Haggard draws on the work of Libet and makes a case for a monistic, materialistic view of volition. He concludes with the statement, “Voluntary action is one of the most characteristic features of the human brain [I submit that it is a feature of the immaterial cognitive human mind interactive with and facilitated by the synaptic networks of the brain]. . . . Modern neuroscience rejects the traditional dualist view of volition as a causal chain from the conscious mind or ‘soul’ to the brain and body.” He concludes by stating that, “…modern neuroscience is shifting towards a view of voluntary action being based on specific brain processes, rather than being a transcendental feature of human nature.” He submits that an understanding of the neural processes of volition is “essential for our conventional concept of responsibility for action.” Did my mind make me do it, or did my brain?